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Abstract
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, its successor states have suffered from cycli-
cal currency crises. The most recent episode of 2014–2016 was caused by a combina-
tion of external and domestic factors. The former include tighter US monetary policy, 
slower global growth, and declining commodity prices, whereas the latter include 
the former Soviet Union (FSU) economies’ extreme macroeconomic fragility (a legacy 
of past crises ), numerous microeconomic rigidities and structural distortions in addition 
to govern mental deficits. In addition, the Russian–Ukraine conflict dealt a heavy blow to 
both economies and their neighbors. Effective anti-crisis policies must aim at eliminat-
ing all deep-rooted causes of repeated financial and macroeconomic turbulence and must 
involve deep structural and institutional reforms in the entire region. 
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1. Introduction
The rapid depreciation of the Russian ruble (RUR) and of the currencies of 
other countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) in 2014–2016 revived the ques-
tion of macroeconomic stability in this region, a question that has arisen several 
times since the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991. As with previous currency cri-
ses, particularly the 1998–1999 and 2008–2009 crises, the most recent episode 
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was caused by a combination of global, regional and country-specific factors. 
While identifying global shocks and related transmission channels seems to be 
relatively easy in each case, specification of regional and country-specific factors 
requires greater in-depth diagnoses, which is precisely the purpose of this paper. 
Our analysis concentrates on the most recent episode, which cannot be con-
sidered as definitely finished as of the date of this paper, i.e., August 2016. We 
begin by defining various forms of financial crises — including currency crises — 
and a brief review of three generations of theoretical models that attempt to ex-
plain the causes of currency crises (Section 2). In Section 3, to facilitate a bet-
ter understanding of the deep roots of the latest turmoil, we provide a historical 
overview of previous currency crises and their causes, beginning with the last 
years of the Soviet Union. Then, we analyze the dynamics of the 2014–2016 cri-
sis in Russia, Ukraine and in other FSU countries (Section 4), including mecha-
nisms meant to combat regional spillovers and to engage in crisis management. 
Section 5 discusses the global and regional causes of the recent crisis, including 
declining oil prices in 2014–2016. In Section 6, we discuss the deeper systemic 
causes of the fragility of FSU currencies. Finally, Section 7 presents conclusions 
and policy lessons. 
While the paper draws from three previous publications (Dabrowski 2015a, 
2015b, 2015c), it offers an updated and more comprehensive analysis of the cur-
rency crises in Russia and the FSU and uses a fresh set of statistical data available 
as of August 2016 that come from the IMF, the World Bank, various national 
central banks and statistical agencies, and other institutions in charge of cross-
country comparative analyses related to the FSU region. 
2.	Definitions	and	theoretical	models
The meaning of currency crisis is not particularly precise and often requires 
clarification. For purposes of this paper, currency crisis is defined as a sudden 
decline in confidence in a given currency, usually leading to a speculative attack 
against it. Analytically, currency crises can be detected by either substantial de-
preciation in a given currency, a decline in a country’s international reserves, or 
both (Dabrowski, 2003a, p. 5). 
We also must distinguish currency crisis from the broader notion of financial 
crisis (Table 1), which involves all types of instability related to monetary and fi-
nancial systems (see IMF, 1998, pp. 74–76). We define financial crisis as a sudden 
decline in confidence in relation to the ability of a country’s government/ central 
bank and banking sector with respect to their liabilities (on committed terms). 
Other forms of financial crisis are defined as follows. Banking crisis refers to 
actual or potential bank runs or failures that induce commercial banks to suspend 
the internal convertibility of their liabilities. A public debt crisis occurs when 
Table	1
Typology of financial crises.
Financial crisis
Banking crisis
Public debt crisis
Balance of payments crisis ⇒ Currency crisis
Sources: Antczak (2000); Dabrowski (2003a).
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a government cannot service its foreign and/or domestic debt. A balance of pay-
ment crisis involves a structural imbalance between a deficit in the current account 
(absorption) and capital and financial accounts (sources of financing) that leads 
to a currency crisis (as defined above) after international reserves are exhausted. 
Historically, three major generations of theoretical models followed the re-
spective rounds of currency crises. The first-generation models were developed 
by Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984), among others, in response to 
a series of currency crises in Latin America in the 1970s and early 1980s and 
focused on the inconsistency between the exchange-rate peg and expansionary 
macroeconomic policies. In these models, the central bank accommodates any 
changes in domestic money demand through purchases or sales of international 
reserves. Therefore, if domestic credit expansion (typically caused by moneti-
zation of a fiscal deficit) exceeds the money demand, international reserves will 
decline at the rate of credit expansion, ultimately leading to their depletion. 
Furthermore, once they understand that the collapse of an exchange-rate peg is 
unavoidable, economic agents will trigger speculative attacks to avoid losses or 
to earn speculative gains. Thus, the moment of a currency crash can be hastened 
relative to the pace of reserves depletion under “normal” circumstances. 
In the second-generation models (see, among others, Obstfeld, 1994, 1997; 
Drazen, 1999) developed after speculative attacks against the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism in Europe in 1992 and the Mexican peso in 1994, the government 
can choose between defending an exchange-rate peg and abandoning it. The lat-
ter choice could be justified, for example, by the expected output/employment 
losses caused by the high interest rates required to stop speculative attacks on 
the currency. Economic agents are not certain which option will be chosen, which 
creates room for uncertainty and various market-game strategies. Therefore, 
the behavior of economic agents is determined not only by their perception of 
macroeconomic fundamentals (as in the first-generation models) but also by 
the expected reaction by the government. 
The experience of the Asian crises in 1997–1998 led to a third generation 
of models that focus on the moral-hazard driven over-borrowing by large but 
poorly regulated banks, other financial institutions and non-financial corporations 
(McKinnon and Phil, 1996; Krugman, 1998, 1999; Corsetti et al., 1998a, 1998b, 
1998c). According to these models, an economic agent may expect a govern-
ment rescue operation for a large bank or corporation with good political connec-
tions in the event that it faces solvency problems. Therefore, part of private sector 
“over-borrowing” can be understood as implicit government debt (a contingent 
fiscal liability), which may eventually have to be monetized. 
3.	Historical	overview
The most recent series of currency crises in the FSU region is neither a new 
nor a completely unexpected phenomenon. Since the end of the 1980s, when 
the Soviet economic system of central planning and command economy entered 
the phase of its gradual final agony as a result of its deep monetary, fiscal and 
balance-of-payments disequilibria (for a detailed analysis of this period, see 
Gaidar, 2007), at least five rounds of region-wide macroeconomic turbulences 
leading to currency crashes can be distinguished. These include the collapse of 
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the Soviet monetary system (1989–1993), monetary instability and high inflation/ 
hyperinflation in the newly established successor states to the FSU (1992–1995), 
the Russian and CIS financial crisis of 1998–1999, fallout from the global finan-
cial crisis of 2007–2009, and the most recent episode of 2014–2016. Furthermore, 
some countries have experienced their own individual currency crises, in addi-
tion to the above-mentioned regional episodes, including, for example, Belarus in 
2000 and 2011 (Dabrowski, 2016) and Tajikistan (1997 and a prolonged period of 
currency depreciation between 1998 and 2003). 
3.1. Collapse of the Soviet ruble (1989–1993)
The FSU never enjoyed macroeconomic stability even by standards of central-
ly planned economies (e.g., the former Czechoslovakia and German Democratic 
Republic performed better in this respect). However, due to extensive price and 
foreign exchange controls, the steadily increasing disequilibria did not lead to an 
openly high inflation rate or to an official exchange rate depreciation. Instead, 
these disequilibria were manifested in physical shortages of goods and services, 
and black market exchange rate premia. In monetary terms, it led to the phenom-
enon of “forced” saving (money holders could not spend their cash balances to 
purchase desired goods and services because they were not available on the mar-
ket) and an accumulation of money “overhang”. 
The situation worsened in the second half of the 1980s (see Gaidar, 2007) 
thanks to the triple shock of (i) declining oil prices (which led to deteriorating 
balance of payments and declines in budget revenues), (ii) the anti-alcohol cam-
paign (which caused further damage to budget revenue) and (iii) the gradual loss 
of control of the Soviet Union’s authorities over state-owned enterprises and over 
the Soviet republics. 
The third shock resulted from a reluctance to abandon a command system of 
central planning while the political system was entering onto the path of gradual 
liberalization and democratization (Mau, 1996). The administrative discipline and 
associated coercion tools no longer worked, but they were not replaced by mar-
ket discipline. The partial economic reforms introduced in 1987–1988 (laws on 
state-owned enterprises, cooperatives and leasing) did not offer a comprehensive 
market-based system. Instead, they only worsened macroeconomic discipline and 
the previously existing disequilibria, which led to various types of distortions, 
including the beginning of oligarchic fortunes based on price and exchange rate 
arbitrage and the stripping of profits and assets from state-owned companies. 
The long and inconclusive debate on the potential direction that reforms might 
take in 1990–1991, particularly on price liberalization, led to increased inflation-
ary expectations, flight from the ruble and further worsening of macroeconomic 
disequilibria. 
The same story applied to the political emancipation process of the former Soviet 
republics, which sped up after the first — partly democratic — elections to republi-
can parliaments on March 4, 1990. Their struggle for sovereignty included taking 
political control over republican central banks (these banks had been mere branches 
of the State Bank of the USSR), credit extension, state-owned enterprises, revenue 
transfers to the Soviet Union budget (which were halted), etc. (Dabrowski, 1997). 
As result, the Soviet Union’s budget was financed largely from money emission, 
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which led to very high inflation in both open and hidden forms in 1991. The former 
resulted from administrative price increases finally introduced in April 1991 that 
were not sufficient to eliminate physical shortages of goods.
Despite the political collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, the Soviet 
ruble survived until the second half of 1993, which complicated the process of 
macroeconomic stabilization in the successor states of the former USSR (see 
Section 3.2). 
3.2. Monetary instability in the FSU (1992–1995)
At the beginning of 1992, all FSU countries had liberalized, fully or partly, 
consumer and producer prices, which led to very high corrective inflation rates 
ranging from a few hundred to a few thousand percent (Table 2). Market exchange 
rates depreciated rapidly. Given the huge initial disequilibria and accumulated 
monetary overhang (see Section 3.1) this period was, to some degree, unavoid-
able. However, the situation worsened because of weak monetary and fiscal poli-
cies underpinned by macroeconomic and social populism, the continued existence 
of the Soviet ruble (managed by fifteen central banks subordinated to national 
parliaments and governments) and, in some instances (such as in the southern 
Caucasus, Moldova and Tajikistan) by violent conflict and political instability. 
The Baltic countries were the first to manage to escape this currency mess. In 
1992, they introduced their own national currencies, fixed them to the Deutsche 
Mark (Estonia), IMF Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) (Latvia) or the US dollar 
(USD) (Lithuania) based on a currency board (Estonia and Lithuania) or quasi- 
currency board mechanism (Latvia). In the subsequent years, they continued 
radical market reforms and stable macroeconomic policies, which eventually 
led them to assume the position of reform leaders in the post-communist world 
and to their membership in the European Union (EU) in 2004 and the Euro area 
( between 2010 and 2015). 
The remaining twelve post-Soviet states, including Russia, faced serious ob-
stacles to achieving basic macroeconomic stability. Russia began radical but in-
complete and inconsequential market reforms at the end of 1991 (the so-called 
Gaidar program). Everywhere in the FSU, the 1992–1994 period was marked by 
Table	2
FSU: end-of-year CPI inflation, 1993–2000 (%).
Country 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Armenia 10 896.2 1884.5 31.9 5.8 21.9 –1.3 2.0 0.4
Azerbaijan 1350.0 1792.1 84.6 6.7 0.4 –7.6 –0.5 2.2
Belarus 1996.6 1959.7 244.0 39.3 63.1 181.7 251.2 107.5
Georgia n/a n/a 57.4 13.7 7.2 10.7 10.9 4.6
Kazakhstan 2165.0 854.6 60.4 28.6 11.3 1.9 18.1 9.8
Kyrgyzstan 929.9 62.1 32.1 34.8 13.0 16.8 39.9 9.6
Moldova 837.0 116.1 23.8 15.1 11.1 18.2 43.8 18.5
Russia 839.9 215.1 131.3 21.8 11.0 84.4 36.5 20.2
Tajikistan 7344.0 1.1 2144.2 40.5 163.6 2.7 30.1 60.6
Turkmenistan n/a 1327.9 1261.5 445.8 21.5 19.8 20.1 7.4
Ukraine 10 155.0 401.1 181.7 39.7 10.1 20.0 19.2 25.8
Uzbekistan 884.8 1281.4 116.9 64.4 50.2 26.1 26.0 28.2
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, October 2012.
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high fiscal and quasi-fiscal deficits financed by money emission, which resulted 
in very high inflation, abrupt devaluations of newly established national curren-
cies (such as occurred in Russia on “Black Tuesday”, October 11, 1994) and deep 
output declines. In three extreme cases, the lack of fiscal and monetary discipline 
led to hyperinflation not only in war-torn Georgia (an inflation rate of 50,654% 
for the 12-month period ending in September 1994) and Armenia (29,600.9% 
in May 1994) but also in Ukraine (10,155% in December 1993) (Dabrowski, 
2003b). Referring to the theoretical model analyzed in Section 2, both periods 
(1989–1991 and 1992–1995) were marked by first-generation crises. 
In most FSU countries, stability of sorts was finally achieved in 1994–1995, after 
completely abandoning the Soviet ruble in the second half of 1993, introducing na-
tional currencies (the same year) and launching IMF-sponsored reform programs. 
3.3. Russian and CIS financial crisis of 1998–1999
The relative stability accomplished in 1994–1995 proved unsustainable. 
The money supply had been taken under control but the underlying fiscal dis-
equilibria continued. These equilibria were partly reduced and financed by issu-
ing Treasury securities to private investors rather than by central bank lending. 
However, domestic financial markets remained shallow and foreign purchasers 
required high risk premia. Soon, the slow pace of fiscal adjustment and structural 
reforms, and continued output decline undermined the sustainability of such fi-
nancing. The contagion effect from the Asian crises of 1997–1998, a strengthen-
ing USD and the collapse of oil prices added to the market pressures. 
As a result, on August 17, 1998, Russia defaulted on its public debt obligations 
and abandoned the USD currency band, which led to ruble devaluation by three-
quarters of its initial value. Soon market panics spread to other FSU countries, 
which were suffering from the same macroeconomic vulnerabilities as Russia. 
All but Azerbaijan and Armenia recorded substantial currency depreciation be-
tween mid-1998 and mid-1999 (Fig. 1). Russia and Ukraine were forced to rene-
gotiate their government debt obligations with creditors. Banking crises occurred 
Fig. 1. Nominal depreciation per unit of national currency against the USD  
between June 1998 and June 1999 (%).
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics.
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in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan; these were additional examples 
of the first-generation model of currency crisis. 
Abrupt devaluation led to a new wave of high inflation; fortunately, in most 
cases, these inflationary bouts were rather short-lived (Table 2). Moreover, these 
inflationary spells helped close balance-of-payments gaps and increased nominal 
budget revenue while expenditures were not fully indexed. 
3.4. Fallout from the global financial crisis (2008–2009)
The 1998–1999 crisis was followed by almost a decade of high growth, much 
lower inflation (but nonetheless higher than inflation in other transition and 
emerging-market economies at that time), better fiscal performance (particularly 
in the oil and gas producing and exporting countries), growing international re-
serves, higher demand for domestic money balances and relative exchange rate 
stability (Dabrowski, 2013). This period resulted from favorable global condi-
tions, i.e., abundant liquidity, high oil and other commodity prices (Fig. 2), large-
scale capital inflows, and reaping the initial rewards attributable to the decade-
long structural and institutional transformation. 
However, the global macroeconomic shock triggered by the financial crisis in 
the US and part of Europe spanning the 2007–2009 period set back most of those 
accomplishments. The global liquidity squeeze, particularly following the bank-
ruptcy of the Lehmann Brothers in September 2008, led to massive capital out-
flows from emerging markets. A bit earlier, in the summer of 2008, the previ-
ous commodity bubble burst, with oil prices plummeting to one-third of their 
pre-crisis peak (Fig. 2). As result, Russia and other FSU economies experienced 
capital outflows, declines in foreign exchange reserves, depreciation of their cur-
rencies (Fig. 3), deterioration in fiscal accounts, GDP declines or stagnation, and 
tensions in their banking systems. However, the scale of currency depreciation 
was smaller than a decade earlier and one country (Azerbaijan) even recorded 
currency appreciation during this period. 
As discussed above, the FSU economies (with the exception of Belarus and 
(partly) Ukraine) entered the period of the 2008–2009 global turmoil with more 
Fig. 2. Commodity price indices, 2000–2015 (2005 = 100).
Source: IMF Primary Commodity Price System, http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/External_Data.xls.
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solid macroeconomic fundamentals than they brought to the 1998–1999 crisis. 
Therefore, a third-generation model of currency crises (microeconomic over- 
borrowing plus negative external spillovers and contagion) can be conceived of 
in place of the first-generation model that effectively explained the causes of pre-
vious crises (in late 1980s and 1990s). 
Although the global liquidity squeeze was overcome in the spring of 2009 by 
aggressive monetary policy easing of the major central banks, and global trade, 
GDP and commodity prices began to recover in the second half of 2009, Russia 
and other FSU countries did not return to their previously high growth rates. Other 
macroeconomic indicators also deteriorated compared to the pre–2008 period.
4.	Dynamics	of	the	2014–2016	crisis
The most recent episode of currency crisis began in Russia and Ukraine in 
early 2014 as result of a combination of global, regional and country-specific 
factors (see Sections 5 and 6). In terms of theory, it involved elements of sec-
ond- and third-generation models of currency crises. At the end of 2014 and early 
2015 the crisis had spread to neighboring countries. The scale of the currency 
depreciation has been so far comparable with 1998–1999 shock rather than with 
that of 2008–2009 (see Fig. 4).
4.1. Russia
The gradual depreciation of the ruble against both the Euro and the USD be-
gan in November 2013, before the onset of the Russian-Ukraine conflict and 
when oil prices were still high. The pace of depreciation accelerated in March 
and April 2014, after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the first round of US 
and EU sanctions against Russia. Between May and July 2014, the ruble partly 
regained its previous value. 
However, the depreciation trend returned in the second half of July 2014. 
Its pace quickened in October 2014 and peaked between December 2014 and 
Fig. 3. Nominal depreciation of one unit of national currency against USD 
between June 2008 and June 2009 (%).
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics.
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February 2015, with a short episode of market panics on December 16–17, 2014 
(Fig. 5). Since the end of February 2015, the ruble has partly recovered, reaching 
its early November 2014 value in mid-May 2015. Next, the depreciation trend re-
turned with the first bottom point in the second half of August 2015 when the ru-
ble again reached its January 2015 nadir. After a modest recovery in September 
and October 2015, it continued to plummet reaching its lowest ever level of 81.84 
RUR per one USD on January 27, 2016. Between February and April 2016, 
another appreciation period could be observed. However, by mid-April 2015, 
the ruble had managed to return only to its January 2015 exchange rate. 
Fig. 5 suggests that changes in the exchange rate follow changes in oil prices. 
However, this is not the only factor that determines changes on the forex market . 
Fig. 4. Nominal depreciation of one unit of national currency against USD  
between December 2013 and December 2015 (%).
Source: Statistical data of FSU central banks (as of April 15, 2016).
Fig. 5. Crude oil prices, in USD per 1 barrel (left axis) and RUR/USD exchange rate  
(right axis, reverse scale), 2013–2016.
Sources: Central Bank of Russia (CBR), http://www.cbr.ru/eng/currency_base/dynamics.aspx and US Energy 
Information Administration, http://www.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/TblDefs/pet_pri_spt_tbldef2.asp.
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Among other determinants, changes in exchange rate regimes and the scale 
of foreign exchange intervention of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR), crisis-
management policies (Section 4.4), changes in the intensity of the conflict with 
Ukraine, Western sanctions against Russia and Russian counter-sanctions, and 
the fluctuation in capital flows have played prominent roles. We will return to this 
analysis in Section 5. 
As with the previous two crises (1998–1999 and 2008–2009), the recent crisis 
in Russia has been driven by developments in the capital account rather than in 
the current account. As shown in Fig. 6, Russia’s current account balance remains 
in surplus. 
On the other hand, net private capital flows have generally been negative ex-
cept for a short period of 2006–2007 (Fig. 7). In the crisis years of 2008 and 
2014, they reached record-high negative levels of USD 133.6 and 152.9 billion, 
respectively. Furthermore, the entire post-2008 period has been marked by inten-
sified net capital outflows.
This was exactly the main shock channel that hit Russia in 2014. It led not 
only to the deep depreciation in the ruble but also to the substantial depletion of 
Fig.	6. Russia: current account balance, 2000–2015 (% of GDP).
Note: IMF staff estimates for 2015.
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database, April 2016. 
Fig. 7. Russia, net private capital flows, 2000–2015 (USD billion).
Note: Sign (–) means net capital inflows, sign (+) means net capital outflow.
Source: http://www.cbr.ru/statistics/credit_statistics/bop/outflow.xlsx.
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the CBR’s international reserves (Fig. 8). Between November 2013 and March 
2015, Russia lost approximately USD 160 billion of its international reserves. 
This was the period in which the CBR tried to defend the ruble by massive in-
terventions on the forex market (particularly in mid-December 2014). During 
the next 12 months (until March 2016), it recovered approximately 20% of its 
previous reserve losses. 
4.2. Ukraine
In parallel with the decline of the Russian ruble, a similar process was ob-
served in neighboring Ukraine. The hryvna (UAH), which was previously fixed 
quite tightly at the level of approximately eight UAH to one USD, began to de-
preciate rapidly in February 2014 as the result of Ukraine’s domestic political cri-
sis (Euromaidan and the collapse of the Yanukovych regime) and the subsequent 
Russian annexation of Crimea and conflict in Donbass (Fig. 9). 
Fig. 8. Russia’s international reserves, 2013–2016 (USD billion).
Source: Bank of Russia, http://www.cbr.ru/eng/hd_base/default.aspx?Prtid=mrrf_m.
Fig. 9. Exchange rate of the Ukrainian hryvna, 2014–2016 (UAH/100 USD).
Source: National Bank of Ukraine, http://www.bank.gov.ua/control/en/curmetal/currency/search?formType= 
searchPeriodForm&time_step=daily&currency=169&periodStartTime=31.12.2013&periodEndTime=16.04. 
2016&outer=table&execute=Search.
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In 2014, the depreciation trend stopped and even partly reversed on two oc-
casions: between the end of April and July with the first tranche of the IMF’s 
stand-by loan, and in October following the ceasefire in Donbass. However, in 
November 2014, the rapid depreciation trend resumed, partly as result of a con-
tagion effect from Russia, partly because of the slow pace of fiscal adjustment 
(the consolidated fiscal and quasi-fiscal deficit exceeded 10% of GDP in 2014), 
and partly resulting from a new escalation of the war in Donbass. The hryvna 
reached its lowest point of 30 UAH per one USD on February 26, 2015. Since 
that time, thanks to the new IMF program, a three-year extended fund facility 
(EFF) and the Minsk-2 ceasefire agreement, the hryvna recovered to approxi-
mately 21 UAH per one USD in the third week of May 2015 and remained at this 
level until October 2015. Then, the depreciation trend resumed. After February 
2016, the hryvna reached a new level of 25–26 UAH per one USD. 
Throughout 2014 and into early 2015, there were several waves of market pan-
ics, taking the form of a massive withdrawal of hryvna deposits from Ukrainian 
banks and their conversion into foreign currency. In 2015, Ukraine was forced to 
restructure part of its public debt owed to Eurobond holders. 
As Fig. 10 shows, the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) lost approximately three-
quarters of its gross international reserves between December 2013 and February 
2015. These losses have been partly recovered, thanks to the IMF EFF loan. 
4.3. Other FSU countries 
In 2014–2015, the currency crisis spread to other FSU countries. The spillover 
and contagion mechanisms involved decreasing trade volumes and deteriorat-
ing terms of trade with Russia, lower remittances from labor migrants working 
in Russia (particularly from Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Moldova, and 
Armenia) and, most importantly, the devaluation expectations of households 
and financial market players. Those countries, which depend on Russia as an 
important trading partner — and particularly those that belong to the Russia-led 
Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU) — could not sustain the sharp nominal appre-
ciation of their currencies against the RUR. However, most importantly, all FSU 
Fig.	10. Ukraine’s international reserves in billions of USD, end-of-month, 2014–2016.
Source: National Bank of Ukraine, http://www.bank.gov.ua/doccatalog/document?id=46950.
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countries share the same fundamental macro- and microeconomic vulnerabilities 
(see Section 6). 
As shown in Fig. 4, the currencies of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Belarus have 
been most heavily hit. Between the end of 2013 and 2015, these currencies lost 
approximately half of their value against the USD. The currencies of Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova and Tajikistan lost between 30 and 35% of their value. Other currencies 
suffered less, but it must be remembered that the convertibility of the Uzbekistani 
som (UZS) and the Turkmenistan manat (TKM) remain heavily restricted. 
The case of Azerbaijan, whose currency, the manat (AZN), survived two pre-
vious crises intact (1998–1999 and 2008–2009) (Figs. 1 and 3) but suffered heav-
ily in the 2014–2016 crisis, deserves particular attention. Notably, Azerbaijan 
is not as dependent on trade with and remittance inflows from Russia as other 
FSU countries. Azerbaijan suffered largely from declining oil prices, lowered 
oil output, regional contagion effects and poor crisis management (see below). 
The AZN held up against market pressure until the end of 2014, but beginning in 
January 2015, it experienced a few waves of depreciation with a cumulative loss 
against the USD of 49.7% by the end of 2015. In turn, depreciation of AZN led to 
systemic banking crisis in 2016.
The culmination of the market contagion shock came in December 2014 and 
January 2015, following the peak of the developing crisis in Russia (Section 4.1). 
In particular, it was visible in Belarus, Armenia (which successfully resisted pres-
sure and recorded the smallest depreciation of its dram, by only 16.1% only — see 
Fig. 4), Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova (Dabrowski, 2015a). 
4.4. Shortcomings in crisis management
There is no doubt that shortcomings in crisis management added to market 
panics and, as a result, to the extent of currency depreciation. Most countries, in-
cluding Russia, seemed to be surprised by both the crisis itself and its magnitude. 
In addition, it did not help that comprehensive anti-crisis policies had not been 
adopted, which led to several miscalculations and clear mistakes. In particular, 
the response of these countries did not include sufficient fiscal adjustment as well 
as structural and institutional reforms to address the deep roots of the crisis (see 
Section 6). Weaknesses in public communication and insufficient transparency 
also did not help with crisis management. 
Over the short term, anti-crisis measures included foreign exchange interven-
tions, increases in interest rates, changes in monetary/exchange-rate regimes, 
 foreign exchange restrictions, and other policy steps. 
4.4.1. Foreign exchange interventions
In the beginning, most central banks responded to market pressures against their 
currencies by combining foreign exchange interventions and gradual devaluations. 
However, only a few of these banks, i.e., in principle only those in oil-produc-
ing countries, had enough international reserves to continue such strategies over 
the longer term. Because they were aware of these constraints, market players be-
came quickly skeptical about the chances of successful defending strategies (and 
the political will to implement any such defenses), which led to increasing specula-
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tive pressures (i.e., the typical situation described by the second-generation model). 
This skepticism involved not only professional participants in the forex markets but 
also all resident and non-resident holders of financial assets (the reason for massive 
capital flight), including households. The latter withdrew bank deposits in the ap-
plicable domestic currency and converted their money into USD or Euros, often 
also attempting to speculatively purchase durable goods and real estate. 
In all FSU countries, reserve losses proved substantial by the end of 2014 
(Dabrowski, 2015a) and ultimately forced authorities to change their initial 
strate gies. 
4.4.2. Interest rate increases
Increasing the central bank’s interest rate is a correct reaction to speculative 
pressure against a currency but in most of the cases discussed herein, the increas-
es came too late (November-December 2014) and were frequently insufficient 
to stop market panics. For example, the CBR increased its rate for repo opera-
tions (with maturities of between one-day and one-week) from 10.5% to 17.0% 
on December 16, 2014. It did not have an immediate effect in terms of arresting 
market pressures, which continued for a few more weeks but this action helped 
with market stabilization over the longer term 
The National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (NBRB) increased its interest 
rate for overnight credit to 50% on December 19, 2014.1 
The Central Bank of Armenia (CBA) increased its refinancing rate from 6.75% 
to 8.5% on December 23, 2014 and again to 9.5% on January 22, 2015. The lom-
bard repo rate increased from 8.25% to 10.25% on November 24, 2014 to 21% on 
December 3, 2014, and then decreased to 20% on December 23, 2014 and 17% 
on January 22, 2015. The CBA deposit rate increased from 5.25% to 7.0% on 
December 23, 2014 and then to 8.0% on January 22, 2015.2
On December 12, 2014, the National Bank of Moldova increased its overnight 
credit rate from 6.5% to 7.5%, its basic rate from 3.5% to 4.5%, and the overnight 
deposit rate from 0.5% to 1.5%. On December 29, 2014, all rates were hiked 
again, to 9.5%, 6.5% and 3.5%, respectively.3
The discount rate of the National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic was systemati-
cally increased from 6% in June 2014 to 11% on January 26, 2015.4 
Once the most severe phase of currency crisis had ended (in the first quarter of 
2015) most central banks cut their interest rates but by the end of 2015 they had 
not returned to pre-crisis levels. 
4.4.3. Changes in monetary regimes and transparency problems
When international reserves ran down (Section 4.4.1), some central banks were 
forced to change their previously implemented monetary regimes. A broader in-
ternational comparison of the impact of an oil price decline on the macroeco-
 1 See http://www.nbrb.by/Press/?nId=89&l=en.
 2 See https://www.cba.am/en/SitePages/fmompiinterestrates.aspx.
 3 See https://www.bnm.md/files/index_30237.pdf.
 4 See http://www.nbkr.kg/DOC/27012015/000000000032420.xls.
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nomic performance of net oil exporters (Dabrowski, 2015c) suggests that both 
floating exchange rates with inflation targeting and credible long-term pegs can 
help minimize the risk of serious currency and financial turmoil. The most vul-
nerable are the so-called hybrid or intermediate regimes (Dabrowski, 2013) in 
which authorities try to control both the exchange rate and the money supply. 
Even worse is the situation in which regime change occurs in the midst of a crisis 
associated with market pressure, which occurred in at least five FSU countries over 
the 2014–2015 period — Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. 
In Russia and Ukraine, the move to a floating exchange rate and inflation tar-
geting was advised by the IMF long ago (after the 1998–1999 crisis). However, 
the “fear of floating” (see Calvo and Reinhart, 2000) was too strong to actually 
make this idea a reality. Finally, it began to be implemented in both countries in 
2014, albeit in the worst possible market environment. 
The CBR changed its de facto exchange rate regime several times over 
the 2014–2015 period, creating the impression that it makes decisions based on 
market and political pressures and not necessarily in accordance with broader 
macroeconomic priorities. First, it defended the RUR exchange rate (until October 
2014). Then, it attempted to minimize losses in international reserves by declar-
ing a transition to a floating exchange rate and inflation targeting. However, im-
mediately following the December 16, 2014 market panics, it returned to foreign 
exchange interventions. Then, in 2015–2016, it continued its active interventions 
on the forex market by purchasing foreign exchange to rebuild its international 
reserves. Thus, CBR communication policy remained unclear and contributed to 
market uncertainty. Worse, at the peak of market speculation against the RUR, 
the CBR was suspected of participating in non-transparent schemes to provide 
financial support to large state-controlled corporations (see Guriev, 2014). 
The NBU has also changed its de facto exchange rate regime several times, 
first accepting the principle of a floating exchange rate and then intervening 
heavi ly on a few occasions with the aim of stabilizing the exchange rate. 
After a preemptive devaluation in February 2014, the National Bank of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan (NBRK) assured both financial markets and the pub-
lic many times that it would not devalue again. However, the next devaluation 
occurred in 2015, whereupon the KZT exchange rate became floating, leading to 
even further depreciation. 
A similar scenario (the assurance of currency stability followed by chaotic de-
valuation) occurred in Azerbaijan with its 2015 devaluation, and the psychologi-
cal shock was even more severe after twenty years of AZN stability. 
4.4.4. Foreign exchange controls
At least two countries (Belarus and Ukraine) resorted to foreign exchange 
controls, including restrictions on current account transactions, but these moves 
only served to fuel the nervous reactions of market agents to various shocks and 
uncertainties. 
In December 2014, the NBRB introduced a 30% commission on any form 
of purchase of foreign currency by physical persons5 and other restrictions on 
 5 http://www.nbrb.by/Press/?nId=84&l=en.
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foreign currency trading. These restrictions were gradually removed by the end 
of February 2015. 
In Ukraine, various forms of restrictions on current account transactions were 
introduced at the end of 2013 and remained in force in April 2016. 
5.	Role	of	global	and	regional	factors	
5.1. US monetary policy
Among the global factors that contributed to the 2014–2016 crisis, US mone-
tary policy played an important role. Since mid-2013, the expectation of the phas-
ing down of Quantitative Easing 3, which eventually occurred in October 2014, 
and then the expectations of an increase in the US Federal Fund Rate with the first 
step taken in December 2015, led to tighter global liquidity conditions, which 
could not be fully compensated for by simultaneous monetary easing by the ECB 
and the Bank of Japan because of the much smaller size of the financial markets 
in the Euro and yen. Thus, net capital inflows into emerging-market economies 
decreased, growth in these economies decelerated and commodity prices began to 
fall (see Feldstein, 2014, and Frankel, 2014, on the effects of US monetary tight-
ening on oil and commodity prices). Since the end of 2013, the dollar has appreci-
ated against most currencies with flexible exchange rates (Fig. 11).
Some of these currencies, in particular, the Brazil real (BRL) and the South 
African rand (ZAR), recorded cumulative nominal depreciations comparable in 
size with such FSU countries as Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Tajikistan and higher 
than Georgia (Section 4.3 and Fig. 4). However, in countries with floating ex-
change rate regimes, currency depreciation had a smoother character that was 
extended over time and free from speculative pressures. 
5.2. Decline in oil and commodity prices 
The sharp decline in oil prices since mid-2014 (Fig. 2) was caused by a com-
bination of several factors. Slowing growth in emerging-market economies, 
energy-saving policies in developed and developing countries, and the devel-
opment of renewable energy sources decreased demand for oil. In addition, 
Fig. 11. Nominal depreciation between December 2013 and March 2016  
of one unit of selected currency against the USD (%).
Source: US Federal Reserve Board, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g5/current/default.htm.
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the gradual tightening of US monetary policy (Section 5.1) reduced the appetite 
for speculative purchases of oil and other commodities. Finally, massive invest-
ment in oil-production capacities, including shale oil, in the most recent two 
decades (Dale, 2015) and the declining market power of the OPEC cartel led to 
oversupply. 
Five FSU countries — Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan — are net exporters of oil and natural gas. A sixth country, Belarus, 
benefits from transiting, processing and reselling Russian oil purchased on 
concessionary terms (Dabrowski, 2016). Furthermore, FSU countries also ex-
port ferrous and non-ferrous metals (Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, 
and Tajikistan) and agricultural commodities (Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan). The smaller economies often benefit from trading with 
energy and commodity producers and exporting surplus labor force.
On the other hand, Figs. 12 and 13 show that only Azerbaijan represents the oil 
and gas export monoculture and very high dependence on oil rents, resembling 
Kuwait, Libya, Iraq, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. The same probably ap-
plies to Turkmenistan but a lack of comparable data does not allow verification 
Fig. 12. Fuel exports as % of merchandise exports, 2013, unless otherwise indicated.
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/tx.val.fuel.zs.un.
Fig. 13. Oil rent as % of GDP, June 2013.
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source= 
world-development-indicators#.
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of this hypothesis. Russia, Kazakhstan and (probably) Uzbekistan (again, there is 
a lack of comparable data) are more diversified in terms of their export structures 
(although hydrocarbons play an important role) and are relatively less dependent 
on oil rent. 
Nonetheless, Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan were the most heavily hit 
in terms of currency depreciation (Fig. 14) and its inflationary impact (Fig. 15) 
during the 2014–2016 crisis. Russia was also one of the few oil exporters — apart 
from war-affected Iraq and Libya and Venezuela (which has suffered from more 
than decade of economic populism) — that recorded a decline in GDP in 2015 
(Dabrowski, 2015c). 
Clearly, the impact of global economic developments, including much lower 
energy and commodity prices do not fully explain the depth of the nominal de-
preciation of FSU currencies in 2014–2016. Other factors must be considered, 
including those of a political, security and geopolitical nature. 
Fig. 15. End-of-year inflation,, 2013 and 2015 (%).
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database, October 2015.
Fig. 14. Nominal depreciation of one unit of national currency against USD  
between June 30, 2014 and September 30, 2015 (%).
Source: IMF Exchange Rates, http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/ert/GUI/Pages/Report.aspx?CT=%27DZA%
27,%27BRN%27,%27CAN%27,%27IDN%27,%27IRN%27,%27KAZ%27,%27KWT%27,%27MYS%27,%2
7NOR%27,%27RUS%27&EX=REP&P=DateRange&Fr=635396832000000000&To=635791680000000000
&CF=UnCompressed&CUF=Period&DS=Ascending&DT=NA.
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5.3. Consequences of Ukrainian conflict
The political, military and economic conflict between Russia and Ukraine and 
the resulting political confrontation between Russia and the EU and US nega-
tively affected the two largest FSU economies and their neighbors. 
Since the end of 2013, the Ukrainian economy has been hit by the conse-
quences of domestic political developments (the EuroMaidan, the collapse of 
Yanukovych’s regime and two election campaigns in 2014), followed by Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea (March 2014), conflict in Donbass (since May 2014), and 
imposition of trade restrictions on Ukrainian exports. On the macroeconomic 
front, these factors have translated into heavy losses in GDP, export and tax-
revenues, additional military expenditures, war damage (including human loss-
es), the costs of taking care of internally displaced persons and humanitarian aid, 
further deterioration in the business and investment climate, and dwindling con-
fidence in Ukrainian banks and currency. In particular, the conflict in Donbass, 
which contributed 16% of Ukraine’s GDP and 25% of its exports (Havlik, 2014), 
levied a heavy toll on the country’s fiscal accounts and balance of payments. 
For Russia, the negative consequences included conflict-related damage and 
human losses, additional military spending, the costs of infrastructure projects 
required to integrate the Crimean peninsula into mainland Russia, and support 
to Donbass separatists and population of this region, assistance to refugees from 
Donbass, and disruption of trade with Ukraine (which accounted for some 5% of 
total Russian exports and imports in the early 2010s), among others. Although an 
estimation of the additional fiscal burden for Russia arising from this conflict is 
not publicly known, it is likely to be substantial. 
The EU, US, Canada, Australia, Japan and a few other countries reacted to 
this conflict by imposing diplomatic, political, and economic sanctions against 
Russia. Limiting the access of Russian state-owned banks and large corporations 
to the financial markets has proven to be the most painful measure thus far (see 
Åslund, 2014; Rogov, 2014). This is hardly surprising in light of the 2008–2009 
global financial crisis, when this segment of the Russian economy demonstrated 
the greatest vulnerability to external shocks. Its high short-term refinancing needs, 
in combination with declining oil prices, made investors nervous about the pros-
pects for Russia’s external liquidity in the second half of 2014 and most of 2015. 
Russian authorities underestimated the scale and impact of these sanctions. 
This led to a certain nonchalance in its reaction to subsequent rounds of sanc-
tions, including Russia’s adoption of retaliatory measures against food imports 
from the EU and US in August 2014. Counter-sanctions created additional one-
off inflation pressure, further exacerbated the deterioration of the quality of 
the domestic consumer market, caused trade tensions with EaEU partners, and 
strengthened market fears about policy unpredictability and dominance of geopo-
litical considerations over economic rationales in the country. 
The same type of geopolitical logic led to decisions to impose trade sanctions 
against Turkey (another important economic partner of Russia) after Turkey shot 
down a Russian plane in Syria in November 2015 and to suspend a free-trade 
agreement with Ukraine in January 2016 after activation of the EU-Ukraine Deep 
and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, again without consultation with other EaEU 
partners. The latter suffer not only from Russia’s numerous trade wars (even if 
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some Belarus and Kazakh enterprises benefit from circumventing Russian sanc-
tions and counter-sanctions in the short term) but also from general perceptions 
of higher security risks in the FSU region. 
A general lesson from this experience is the high price of any conflict — even 
of a supposedly local character — in the contemporary highly interlinked global 
economy. 
6.	Deep	roots	of	the	FSU	currency	crises
Apart from those global economic and regional geopolitical factors analyzed 
in Section 5, there have been a number of domestic institutional and policy fac-
tors that have amplified the impact of external shocks. These factors relate to both 
the macroeconomic and microeconomic spheres. 
6.1. Ghosts of the past: Limited credibility of FSU currencies
Analysis of the recent crisis cannot overlook the extreme macroeconomic fra-
gility of the FSU region, which is not a new phenomenon, as evidenced by previ-
ous crises (Section 3). In fact, memories of past crises have had a powerful impact 
on the behavior of domestic economic agents. Over the last 30 years, these eco-
nomic agents have experienced lost savings several times resulting from high in-
flation/ hyperinflation, numerous banking failures, and non-equivalent exchanges 
of money in 1991 and 1993. They remember episodes of abrupt devaluation of 
national currencies. To combat market turmoil, authorities in some countries have 
often resorted to foreign exchange controls (see Section 4.4.4). 
The previous Soviet financial history was also marked by hidden and open 
inflation, forced savings, confiscations of money balances, and various adminis-
trative restrictions on currency use, inconvertibility, etc. 
Central banks in the region are de facto dependent on the executive and legis-
lative branches of government, even when some enjoy independence de jure. 
This dependence can be observed during all the crisis episodes. The same lack 
of independence (and often lack of professional competence) concerns financial 
supervision and has negative consequences for the quality and reliability of fi-
nancial services. 
Hence, neither households nor enterprises in FSU countries trust domestic cur-
rencies and domestic financial systems. As long as there is no serious turbulence, 
the low level of trust might be enough to keep local currencies stable, inflation 
low and banks afloat. However, the level of spontaneous dollarization has re-
mained high even in good times, which is similar to southeastern European and 
(some) Latin American countries (see Table 3). In an adverse shock, whether of 
economic or political origin, related to an external or domestic source, domestic 
money-holders are the first to run from national currencies and domestic banks. 
6.2. Poor business climate and capital flight
Macroeconomic fragility is also deeply rooted in microeconomic, structural 
and institutional imperfections. For years, Russia, Ukraine and other FSU econo-
mies have suffered from numerous structural distortions, poor business and in-
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vestment climates, widespread corruption, weak rule of law, organized crime and 
other factors, which is illustrated in Tables 4 and 5 in the results of two global 
rankings: the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (TI CPI) 
and the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom (HF IEF). 
With the exception of Georgia, which conducted far-reaching institutional re-
forms in 2004–2007 and Armenia (only in the Heritage Foundation ranking), nei-
ther ranking rates any CIS country favorably. Russia and Ukraine have particular-
ly low rankings, i.e., 136th and 142nd out of 174 countries ranked by Transparency 
International, and 140th and 155th out of 185 countries ranked by the Heritage 
Foundation, respectively. 
As long as the external economic environment for CIS countries remained 
favorable (before 2008), the problems highlighted by these rankings could be 
neglected without (overly) negative consequences for economic growth and mac-
roeconomic equilibria. However, the shock associated with the global financial 
crisis of 2008–2009 finished the “golden” era of economic growth, which was 
based, to a great extent, on high commodity prices and massive capital flows to 
emerging-market economies. The Ukrainian economy never really recovered af-
ter this shock (Dabrowski, 2014), while Russia (and most of the other countries) 
enjoyed the positive effects of high oil and commodity prices for a period but 
with a declining rate of economic growth since 2011. 
The business environment in Russia and Ukraine has continued to deteriorate 
following the global crisis. In Russia, the re-nationalization trend (an increasing 
share of state ownership) began with the crackdown on Yukos in 2003–2005 and 
intensified in 2008–2009 when several banks and companies required govern-
ment bailouts. Re-nationalization became particularly visible in the oil, gas and 
Table	3
Foreign currency-denominated liabilities to total liabilities.
Region Country The latest data % of total
CIS Armenia 2012 Dec 64.9
Georgia 2012 Q4 69.3
Kazakhstan 2012 Q2 38.8
Moldova 2012 Q3 49.4
Russia 2012 Q4 25.2
Ukraine 2012 Q4 49.2
Central and  
Eastern Europe
Bosnia & Herzegovina 2012 Dec 65.2
Bulgaria 2011 54.8
Croatia 2012 Q4 77.8
Czech Rep. 2012 Q3 14.1
Macedonia 2012 Q3 45.1
Poland 2012 Q3 20.6
Romania 2012 Q3 37.7
Turkey 2012 Q4 41.2
Latin America Brazil 2012 Q4 11.1
Chile 2013 Jan 21.3
Colombia 2013 Jan 6.8
Peru 2012 Q4 47.1
Asia & Africa India 2012 Q3 6.2
Indonesia 2012 Q4 16.3
South Africa 2012 Dec 5.7
Source: IMF Financial Soundness Indicators.
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financial sectors. Russian domestic business has suffered from unstable prop-
erty rights (the danger of politically motivated expropriation), increasing red tape 
and harassment from various law-enforcement agencies. Russia’s policy toward 
foreign investors has become at best ambiguous and at worst openly unfriendly 
(as demonstrated by various unfavorable legislative and administrative measures 
directed at foreign investors). 
In Ukraine, the Yanukovych presidency (2010–2013) was marked by increas-
ing insecurity of property rights, extreme corruption and nepotism, i.e., favoring 
of the business interests of the narrow group associated with the government and 
Yanukovych’s family, at the expense of other business interests. Unfortunately, 
there has been little improvement since 2014. The interests of major oligarchic 
groups continue to block key reforms, including those that might help eradicate 
corruption and rent-seeking (Wilson, 2016). 
Therefore, it should not be surprising that once their economies were hit by po-
litical instability and war (Ukraine) or prospects of Western sanctions and further 
deterioration of the business climate (Russia), residents — and particularly large 
businesses — were the first to move their financial assets outside the country on 
a massive scale. Similar reactions have been observed in Latin American econo-
Table	4
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 2014, CIS region.
Country Rank Country CPI 2014 Score
50 Georgia 52
94 Armenia 37
103 Moldova 35
119 Belarus 31
126 Azerbaijan 29
126 Kazakhstan 29
136 Kyrgyzstan 27
136 Russia 27
142 Ukraine 26
152 Tajikistan 23
166 Uzbekistan 18
169 Turkmenistan 17
Source: http://files.transparency.org/content/download/1857/12438/file/CPI2014_DataBundle.zip.
Table	5
Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom 2014, CIS region.
World Rank Country 2014 Score
22 Georgia 72.6
41 Armenia 68.9
67 Kazakhstan 63.7
81 Azerbaijan 61.3
85 Kyrgyzstan 61.1
110 Moldova 57.3
139 Tajikistan 52.0
140 Russia 51.9
150 Belarus 50.1
155 Ukraine 49.3
163 Uzbekistan 46.5
171 Turkmenistan 42.2
Source: http://www.heritage.org/index/excel/2014/index2014_data.xls.
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mies during periods of macroeconomic and political instability, particularly in 
the 1980s and 1990s.
The rapid capital outflows from Russia (Fig. 7) and Ukraine have been facili-
tated by the dominant business model in both countries in which most of the large 
companies remain in close ownership relationships with their foreign subsidiaries 
or parent companies (owned by expatriates); thus, a substantial part of their assets 
are kept abroad and their domestic operations financed through foreign borrow-
ing (Rogov, 2014). 
7.	Conclusions	and	policy	lessons	
The period of rapid economic growth and relative macroeconomic stability 
experienced by the FSU countries between 2000 and 2007 and, to lesser degree, 
between 2010 and 2012 seems to be definitively over. Even under the highly im-
plausible scenario of the rapid recovery of oil and other commodity prices to their 
2013 levels, growth in the FSU region will remain stagnant or slow, and macro-
economic equilibria will have to be restored by respective adjustment measures. 
More likely, low commodity prices will become the “new normal” for several 
years ahead, which will mean serious headwind and even more pessimistic mac-
roeconomic prospects for the region. 
Although changes in the global economy, such as gradual tightening of US 
monetary policy, a stronger USD, capital outflows from emerging markets and 
the collapse of energy and commodity prices play an important role in the recent 
crisis in the FSU countries, its deep causes derive from numerous homegrown 
vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities include limited trust in domestic curren-
cies, domestic financial systems and, more generally, in state institutions; inse-
cure property rights; poor business and investment climates; absence of or weak 
rule of law; and widespread corruption, among others. In addition, the Russian-
Ukrainian conflict has added new elements to this already difficult scenario, in-
cluding regional trade disruption, war-related damages and costs and serious se-
curity risks. 
Thus, the policies needed to overcome the current crisis and prevent new cri-
ses must address the above-mentioned domestic macroeconomic vulnerabilities 
and microeconomic distortions, i.e., the FSU nations must embark on deep struc-
tural and institutional reforms to improve their business and investment climates 
and to diversify their economies. More specifically, helpful policy changes in-
clude eliminating various forms of administrative red tape that discourage busi-
ness activity and increase its costs; implementing deep reforms with respect to 
law enforcement agencies (which currently act as parasites on business instead of 
protecting it); instituting an independent, impartial more professional judiciary; 
privatizing state-owned companies; genuine opening to foreign investment; in-
troducing market pricing of the domestic energy supply; thoroughly reviewing 
social entitlements (particularly the early retirement age) that are unsustainable 
in the context of a rapidly aging population; rationalizing public investment proj-
ects and military expenditures; and legislating measures to fight corruption. On 
the macroeconomic front, genuine independence of central banks and constitu-
tionally determined balanced-budget rules are sorely needed to boost confidence 
in domestic currencies and domestic financial systems. 
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The Russian-Ukrainian conflict, which has played a major role in trigger-
ing and deepening the current macroeconomic crisis in Russia, Ukraine, and in 
the entire region, requires rapid resolution based on respect for international law 
and the territorial integrity of each country. A peaceful and sustainable solution 
would yield high economic pay-off to each side. 
Extending beyond the debate regarding anti-crisis policies, the history of cyclical 
currency crashes in the FSU region can offer some input into discussions regarding 
the choice of monetary regime. Since the 1997–1999 series of emerging-market cri-
ses, the IMF has advocated flexible exchange rates and inflation targeting, which has 
proven successful in several high- and medium-income economies. Nevertheless, in 
the FSU region, its implementation never moved beyond initial preparatory steps 
and general declarations of interest. There were several obstacles, such as insuffi-
cient central bank independence (see Section 6.1), the “fear of floating” (Calvo and 
Reinhart, 2000; Dabrowski, 2013), underdeveloped financial markets and deficits in 
analytical and forecasting capabilities in individual central banks. 
In light of the recent experiences described in this paper, the “fear of floating” 
seems to be deeply rooted in FSU economies and cannot be easily eradicated. 
Furthermore, a period of major shocks, political instability/uncertainty, war and 
sanctions is not the best time to implement such policy-regime changes, particu-
larly in countries in which the memories of past macroeconomic instabilities re-
main fresh and painful. 
Looking ahead, large and medium-size economies such as Russia, Ukraine, 
and perhaps Kazakhstan can think about introducing inflation-targeting and free-
floating exchange rate regimes but in a much more stable macroeconomic and 
political environment; these shifts must be reinforced by the necessary institu-
tional reforms (genuine central bank independence) and greater financial market 
depth and soundness. For the smaller CIS economies, another “corner” solution, 
such as a currency board, might be a good option. This mechanism might offer 
several advantages, such as reducing transaction costs in small open economies 
and importing credibility, which is difficult to build internally (as demonstrated 
by the continuous high dollarization in these economies). 
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